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Abstract 
The ‘cultural turn’ has had a profound influence across the humanities and social sciences in the last few 
decades, focusing on the extent to which specificity and particularity underpin what we can know, how we can 
know it, and how this affects our being-in-the world. It has been opposed, in particular, to universalist ideas, or 
at least those developed in European political and social thought. This has opened the way to a range of insights, 
from issues of pluralism and difference, both within political communities and between them, to the instability 
if not impossibility of foundations for knowledge. But because of the deep-seated opposition to virtually all 
forms of universalism implicit in the cultural turn, and which has therefore given it a strongly relativist 
dimension, it tends strongly to undermine cosmopolitan projects. This stems largely from the particular 
conceptualization of ‘culture’ that underpins projects associated with the cultural turn and which is derived 
mainly from the discipline of anthropology. Few studies embracing this ‘cultural turn’, however, have paid more 
than cursory attention to the culture concept itself, nor have its critics. This article suggests that conceptions of 
culture derived mainly from the discipline of anthropology have dominated overwhelmingly, while another 
important tradition of thought associated with the culture concept – namely the humanist tradition – has been 
either ignored or rejected. It argues further that we would do well to reconsider what humanist ideas can 
contribute to how ‘culture’ is both conceptualized and deployed in political thought and action, especially in 
countering the overparticularization of social and political phenomena that marks contemporary culturalist 
approaches and which have therefore tended to militate against cosmopolitan ideas. The article further suggests 
how we can shift from the strong relativist assumptions underpinning the cultural turn towards a conception of 
cosmopolitan pluralism that continues to value difference and particularity while remaining committed to a 
conception of humanity. 
 
 
Introduction 
Approaches to the study of virtually all of the humanities and social sciences, including my 
own discipline of politics and international relations, have been strongly influenced by the 
‘cultural turn’ in recent years. Against the objective certainties supposedly produced by 
universally valid knowledge gleaned through the application of rigorous, scientifically 
grounded methodologies, the turn to culture has emphasized the particularities and 
specificities that underpin an irreducible plurality of knowledges and ‘truths’ possessed by 
people and communities located in different positions, places, hierarchies, times, spheres, 
structures, contexts and so on around the world. This has, at least according to its proponents, 
destabilized the very foundations on which conventional claims to knowledge and truth have 
long rested.  
                                                 
1 This article is one product of an on-going project on ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’. It draws on, and further 
develops, material which has appeared in the following previous publications: Lawson (2006), Lawson (2009) 
and Lawson (2011). I am grateful for the opportunity provided by the UTS Cosmopolitan Civil Societies group 
to present this paper at the ‘Other Cosmopolitanisms’ symposium, and also to the two anonymous referees for 
their helpful comments on the earlier version of this article. 
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The same intellectual currents have seen the repudiation of anything that smacks of universal 
essences, especially that of an essential universal humanity and associated ideologies, 
including cosmopolitanism. One clear expression of these currents has been evident in the 
assertion of a ‘cultural politics of difference’ by those who, in the words of one contributor, 
have sought to ‘trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity, multiplicity, 
and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal in light of the concrete, 
specific, and particular; and to historicize, contextualize, and pluralize by highlighting ‘the 
contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting, and changing.’ (West 1993, p. 257). The 
implications are of course profound, especially in relation to matters such as human rights, 
democracy, conceptions of the good, and so on. And there is an enormous literature, 
especially with respect to the communitarian/cosmopolitan divide in normative theory, which 
reflects just how extensive and vigorous debates over such matters have been. We consider 
this divide in normative theory in due course.  
 
Despite the apparent anti-essentialism of these broad intellectual currents, it seems that some 
forms of essentialism have flourished in culturalist approaches to the assertion of pluralism 
and difference. Indeed, to the extent that they depend on notions of essential Difference for 
their basic rationale, it may be said that ‘culture’ itself becomes the foundation. Certainly, 
this is the case with many ‘culturalist’ approaches to human rights taken by communitarian 
theorists, where it is commonly argued that different ‘cultures’ produce different conceptions 
of what ‘rights’ might attach to being human, or even of what it means to be ‘human’. One 
familiar point is that most ‘cultures’, or at least those outside ‘the West’, have not produced 
their own authentic, autochthonous conceptualizations of the individual on which conceptions 
of universal human rights must ultimately rest. Rather, the latter is a conceptual development 
with a specificity and particularity anchored firmly within ‘the West’ – an entity which is also 
taken very much for granted – and must be contextualized accordingly.2
The purpose of this article is not to go over of familiar ground in debates over such matters of 
human rights and the merits and demerits of either culturalist or universalist approaches. 
  
                                                 
2 This is explicit in the famous statement published by the American Anthropological Association criticizing the 
notion of universal human rights set out in the UN’s Universal Declaration and adopting an explicit cultural 
relativist position. See American Anthropological Association (1947, pp. 539-543). There have been significant 
changes in more recent years, however. While not giving up the concept of culture as something which 
differentiates human communities, the AAA now acknowledges the need for an approach which accommodates 
more universalist aspects of culture. See American Anthropological Association, (1999).  
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There are criticisms to be made of both and, again, the literature is replete with such 
criticisms. The more immediate concern is with the extent to which many studies embracing 
the ‘cultural turn’ have paid little or no attention to the culture concept itself, simply invoking 
the language of cultural specificity and particularity without enquiring into just what these 
terms convey – apart from the fact that they position the author in opposition to some form of 
universality or cosmopolitanism. What is clear, however, is that the conceptualizations of 
culture that figure implicitly or explicitly in these debates, on both sides, are derived from the 
discipline of anthropology, often uncritically so.3
 
  
There is, however, another conception of culture which emerged at around much the same 
time as the anthropological version, and that is a humanist conception. Its subsequent career 
has been rather different and in many quarters it certainly does not seem to have enjoyed the 
same prestige. Indeed, some anthropologists have dismissed it as simply ‘wrong’. I shall 
argue, though, that it may be fruitful to reconsider what humanist ideas have to contribute to 
the conceptualization of ‘culture’, especially in terms of serving as a counter to the over-
particularization of social and political phenomena that has often been used to undermine 
cosmopolitan projects. This also accords with recent trends in more critical anthropological 
work, although these tend to avoid any mention of a humanist conception of culture as 
offering any useful insights.  
 
This article, then, is largely concerned to put a case for a rethinking of the culture concept as 
an essential prerequisite to addressing an important intellectual problem facing the case for 
the reassertion of cosmopolitan ideas in the contemporary period – or for a ‘cosmopolitan 
turn’. That problem is the enormously strong influence that anthropological conceptions have 
had on the idea of culture as manifest in the broad ‘cultural turn’, and which have given rise 
to what I call, for the sake of brevity, a ‘culturalist’ approach to a wide range of issues in 
social and political theory.4
                                                 
3 Note that I use conceptions in the plural indicating that anthropology has produced a variety of definitions. 
 This challenge to an entrenched ‘culturalism’, I suggest, is also 
essential to projects of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ which are attempting to transcend 
a long-established tradition of ‘methodological nationalism’ (see Beck and Sznaider 2006) 
and which I believe is directly comparable to the ‘methodological particularism’ which 
characterizes the cultural turn. The first substantive section looks in some detail at the 
4 This article could easily be filled with quotes and references demonstrating the enormity of this influence, 
leaving no space for anything else, so I must refer the reader instead to several previous works which set this 
out, especially in relation to political studies and historiography: See Lawson, 2006, Lawson 2009.   
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emergence of both anthropological and humanist conceptions to illustrate the assumptions 
underpinning each of these, and therefore what ‘culture’ meant to those who first articulated 
it. Much of this may be well-known to historians of ideas, but it is not evident to me that it is 
known at all to many in the wider community of scholars who regularly make assumptions 
about the particularity of ‘culture’, in accord with the assumptions of the broad cultural turn, 
but rarely consider whether ‘culture’ can also be conceptualized in a way that transcends 
particularity and boundedness and which is therefore capable of supporting a ‘cosmopolitan 
turn’. 
 
The Emergence of Culture Concepts 
The development of concepts of culture in Europe took place in the wake of an enormous 
expansion of knowledge in both social and natural spheres. This occurred as part of the move 
to mount critiques of social institutions within Europe, as well as the attempt to theorize a 
vast new array of facts about the world and its varying inhabitants which had been 
accumulating since long-range voyages of exploration began in the late fifteenth century. 
Before the late nineteenth century, ‘culture’ had been used in English mainly in agricultural 
terms for several centuries, reflecting its origins in the Latin cultura from the composite term 
agri cultura –cultivation of the soil. It also denoted training, fostering, and adornment as well 
as worship and cult (cultus). Later, it came to signify the cultivation of arts and letters and of 
the intellect more generally (Kahler 1968, p. 3). This was a distinctly humanist conception 
first articulated by Matthew Arnold in 1869. Embodied in intellectual, literary and artistic 
achievement transmitted from the past to the present, culture in Arnold’s famous formulation 
referred to ‘the best of what has been thought and said in the world’ (Arnold 1963, p. 6). 
Thus, in the words of Terry Eagleton, the idea of ‘culture’ completed its journey ‘from pig-
farming to Picasso’. (quoted in Reeves 2004, p. 14). 
 
But there was a parallel development in conceptualization taking place which incorporated 
everything from methods of swine-herding to artistic achievement, and which therefore 
seemed much more egalitarian and inclusive. While Matthew Arnold was setting in train the 
practice of cultural critique as a humanist enterprise, a British anthropologist, Edward B. 
Tylor, proposed another definition: ‘Culture or Civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic 
sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’. (Tylor 1987, p. 
37). This definition was to become one of the most widely cited in anthropological literature, 
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appearing regularly in Anglophone textbooks and displayed prominently on the UNESCO 
website until at least 2006.5 By using ‘culture’ to denote a ‘complex whole’, Tylor was on the 
way to producing a reification, turning culture from a process – implied in the original idea of 
cultivation as well as in the humanist sense – into a thing in itself.6
 
 But it was later 
anthropologists, especially the American school of cultural anthropology, who produced 
much more strongly reified versions, as we see shortly. 
Tylor’s anthropological approach is generally regarded as positive and descriptive rather than 
normative and evaluative, thereby placing it firmly within the realm of the scientific rather 
than the moral or aesthetic. It is partly for this reason that Arnold’s conception on the one 
hand, and that of Tylor and subsequent anthropologists on the other, are often seen as in 
tension with each other. Certainly, Arnold’s original conception is generally read (especially 
by anthropologists) as elitist, endorsing a notion of ‘high culture’, and not merely worthless 
in application to the concerns of anthropology, but ethically suspect too. Kroeber and 
Kluckhorn maintain that Arnold’s conception, along with other humanist interpretations, is 
ethnocentric, absolutist, and disdainful of so-called ‘low culture’. The anthropological 
attitude, in contrast, is relativistic, ‘it assumes that every society through its culture seeks and 
in some measure finds values … (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1963, p. 61). One contemporary 
anthropologist, following this example, has said that if ‘we want to retain the idea of culture 
as an analytic tool, we must begin by dismissing Arnold’s construction of it’. (Avruch 1998, 
p. 9).  
 
Arnold’s liberal humanist ideas, however, were much more complex than simple assumptions 
about elitism convey. And if Arnold’s notion of culture ‘was universal in its moral scope and 
application, emerging from and directed towards what was distinctively human in humanity’ 
(Muhern 2000, p. xvi). then it shares some important common ground with anthropology 
which, after all, has also been concerned to delineate, through the concept of culture, that 
which is distinctively ‘human’. Arnold was also concerned with the need to promote 
education so that people could become more critical of their own society. He was very much 
concerned with the ‘cult of inequality’ in Victorian society and its injustices. And if he was 
                                                 
5 Until at least then, Tylor’s definition was to be found at http://portal.unesco.org as the definition of culture, 
although it has since disappeared.  
6 There is much more to Tylor’s formulation that there is space to discuss here, especially in the context of 
evolutionary ideas prevalent in his time which produced certain overlaps with the humanist approach. For 
further discussion see Stocking (1963, pp. 783-799). 
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elitist, he was also scathing in his assessment of the so-called aristocracy which he saw as 
incapable of providing worthwhile leadership, such ‘serenity’ as they possessed coming not 
from a personal harmonization of ideas through the nurturing of culture, but from never 
having had any ideas to trouble them in the first place. (Johnson 1979, esp. pp. 19-24).  
 
Arnold was therefore ultimately concerned with the role of culture and how it might be used 
to address social problems through critique. This was certainly different from the concerns of 
the anthropologists with so-called ‘primitive’ societies. But anthropologists, too, were 
concerned to say something about their own societies through the study of cultural 
phenomena in other places. More generally, the humanist approach places a strong emphasis 
on the relationship between culture and the development of shared values which contribute to 
social cohesion, and this is not dissimilar to anthropological concerns from Tylor’s time to 
the present. These issues aside, although the earliest of the anthropological definitions of 
culture in English was decisive for seeing culture as a ‘complex whole’, thereby prefiguring 
the ‘whole way of life’ approach, Tylor did not quite articulate the concept of ‘a culture’ 
which in turn implied a plurality of different ‘cultures’ as ‘particular ways of life’. In the 
English speaking world, this step was to be taken more than twenty years later by the 
German-born Franz Boas, a key figure in American cultural anthropology (see Stocking 
1992, p. 203).7
 
  
Boas began his career with a notion of culture framed by both humanist and evolutionary 
usages. Developments in his native Germany and Herder’s important plural usage of the 
term, combined with his strong sense of the equal worth of all human communities and a 
concomitant rejection of any standard against which ‘progress’ might be measured, were 
decisive for his later work, and that of his students. Stocking notes that in their further 
development of the culture concept, and in keeping with their own normative purpose in 
demonstrating the intrinsic equality of all human communities and their distinctive practices 
as a counter to biological racism, the Boasian school promoted a more thoroughgoing sense 
of difference between such communities. This stamped American cultural anthropology with 
a strong commitment to the fundamental historicity of all cultural phenomena (Stocking 
1992, p. 203).  
                                                 
7 Note that Stocking, in all his reading of Tylor, found no instance of the use of the word culture in the plural, 
nor in Boas before 1895, and that it starts to appear regularly only in the first generation of Boas’ students 
around 1910.  
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Since that time, anthropological conceptions of culture have proliferated, but in the latter half 
of the twentieth century a hermeneutic or interpretive approach pioneered by Clifford Geertz 
became highly influential, and remains a touchstone for many anthropologists as well as for 
those working in cognate fields. Geertz’s major work on The Interpretation of Cultures 
(1975) is notable, among other things, for leading the anthropological study of culture from 
explanation to the interpretation of meaning and ‘thick description’. Geertz stated his belief 
in the idea of ‘man’ as an ‘animal suspended in webs of significance he has spun for himself’ 
with culture consisting in those webs. The analysis of culture, he said, is therefore ‘not an 
experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.’ (Geertz 
1975, p. 5). This statement encapsulates the key intellectual standpoint of the cultural turn. 
 
While the interpretive approach may have shifted anthropology’s task from explanation to 
interpretation, it retained a heavy emphasis on culture as a marker of difference between 
human communities. It also retained strong elements of the cultural and ethical relativism 
evident in the Boasian approach. These were originally introduced for the purpose of 
defeating evolutionary conceptions of culture along with biological racism. However, to the 
extent that an anthropological conception of culture, rather than biological notions of race, 
has come to be used as a definitive marker of human difference, it now functions in much the 
same way that ‘race’ did in the past (see Lawson 2006) and is indeed implicated in 
contemporary expressions of racism, as we see later. 
 
Defining Culture in the Contemporary World 
By the mid-twentieth century, culture had become one of the most complex words in the 
English language, and open to numerous interpretations (Williams 1976). This was probably 
due at least partly to its strongly appraisive connotations. If a concept denotes something that 
is highly valued, as ‘culture’ usually does, and if a great deal is claimed in its name (for 
example, that culture is the source of all moral values), then it is bound to provoke endless 
contestation among rival claimants over what it really means. At another level, there is a 
problem when culture shifts ‘from something to be described, interpreted, and perhaps 
explained, and is treated instead as a source of explanation in itself.’ (Kuper 2000, xi).  
 
Let us look briefly at a number of different meanings attributed to ‘culture’ in the 
contemporary social and human sciences, conveniently summarized in a typology proposed 
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by cultural theorists Glenn Jordan and Chris Weedon (1995, pp. 6-8), and which attempts to 
categorize the basic understandings that ‘culture’ has acquired over the last century or so.  
 
1.  Culture as ‘a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic 
development’.  
2.  Culture as ‘the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic 
activity’ which generally covers ‘music, literature, painting and sculpture, theatre 
and film.’  
3.  Culture as a ‘particular way of life’ where culture cannot be reduced to any 
one individual but exists only as the property of a particular collective.  
4.  Culture as the signifying system through which a social order is 
communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored. Here culture is a dimension 
of virtually all economic, social and political institutions, and resides in ‘a set of 
material practices which constitute meanings, values and subjectivities’.  
 
The first approximates a humanist approach which denotes the ‘cultivation’ of individual 
mind and character, although it is implicit in anthropological approaches as well. The second 
was originally based on the older conception of ‘high culture’, but which has been expanded 
to include virtually all kinds of ‘popular culture’ and therefore need not carry elitist 
connotations. The third category denotes the existence of cultures in the plural which accords 
with common anthropological conceptions. The fourth is an all-encompassing category 
although the emphasis is clearly on dynamic processes. Jordan and Weedon also say that this 
conception takes two main forms: ‘In its weaker dialectical form, it suggests that as human 
beings create culture, so culture creates them’. In a stronger version, influenced by 
structuralist and poststructuralist theory, culture is the determinant of subjectivity (ibid).  
 
This latter point begs the rather significant question of who has the authoritative resources to 
create or interpret ‘the culture’ that in turn creates subjectivities. It also alerts us to the rather 
important matter of the relationship between culture and power which theorists such as 
Gramsci and Foucault have been concerned to expose. Gramsci in particular has highlighted 
the extent to which those with the power to interpret culture for, or on behalf of, the society 
in question not only do so to their own advantage, but make it seem natural and right, thus 
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producing the conditions for hegemonic control (see Gramsci 1967). Foucault developed 
similar ideas about the way in which ‘regimes of truth’ are imposed through powerful 
discourses (Foucault 1980, p. 3).  
 
Neither, however, could be said to be working within a traditional anthropological 
understanding of ‘culture’ which has often been concerned less with the critique of power 
relations within ‘cultural groups’ than with using the concept to differentiate one group from 
another, and more generally to delineate between the ‘West’ – or ‘Western culture’ – and 
non-Western others (see Lawson 2006, esp. Ch. 8). Certainly, part of this exercise may 
involve explaining how power operates within different cultural groups. But the aim has not, 
at least conventionally, been to critique them – especially if the group in question is ‘non-
Western’. Indeed, (Western) anthropology’s ethos has for a very long time been strongly 
averse to engaging in critiques of non-Western ‘others’. This is at least partly because 
contemporary anthropology, having distanced itself from its previous close associations with 
colonialism, has become a leading exponent of anti-Eurocentrism centrism (but not 
necessarily of ethnocentrism per se) and can scarcely engage in such critiques without 
running foul of some of its own normative presuppositions. 
 
What resources then, can critiques of power that transcend the putative boundaries imposed 
by (cultural) anthropology draw on? This is an important question for any project of critical 
cosmopolitanism. I suggest that we might well look to alternative constructions of cultural 
theory that trace their lineage through a humanist tradition and which are conceived as a 
source of critique. To do so, however, is to go very much against a highly influential trend in 
the academy which has seen a distinct ‘anti-humanist orthodoxy’ holding sway for some time 
(Good 2001, p. 6). At the same time, this orthodoxy has been instrumental in promoting the 
reification and glorification of group identity – whether on the basis of race, colour, gender, 
class, religion, nation, linguistic community or any number of other categories which have 
emerged as manifestations of group essentialism, strenuously opposed to universalist 
essentialism.8
                                                 
8 There are some interesting ideas about ‘strategic essentialism’ which emerge from Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s work in which she effectively argues for the political necessity of invoking group essentialism - for 
example, in the pursuit of feminist causes (Spivak 1993). There is no reason, however, why an equally 
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This approach may be called ‘culturalism’, a term which for present purposes captures the 
general mind-set characteristic of the ‘cultural turn’ in the human sciences and which stands 
opposed to universalizing tendencies, or at least those emanating from Europe or ‘the West’. 
But for all the scathing critiques that culturalists have mounted of the ‘Eurocentric mind’ and 
its construction of ‘others’, culturalism depends above all on the construction of otherness, 
and very often with strong exoticist underpinnings. For without group identities based on a 
differentiating concept such as ‘culture’, we can scarcely have the category of ‘other’ at all. I 
next consider the concept of culture more specifically in relation to humanism, looking at 
both critiques of humanism as well as more supportive observations and arguments. 
 
Culture and Humanism 
The currency of the word ‘humanism’ in Arnold’s time was almost as recent as that of the 
word ‘culture’ (at least in anything much more than an agricultural sense). But as with 
‘culture’, ‘humanism’ emerged as a short-hand for a complex of ideas associated with the 
Renaissance (another nineteenth century term) that coalesced around the notion of ‘an 
essential humanity unconditioned by time, place or circumstance’, something that is 
‘everywhere and always the same’ and which contains an inherent rationality and dignity 
independent of particular theological underpinnings (Davies 2008, p. 24). In terms of today’s 
culturalist parlance, such a view would be denounced as a wholly untenable universalist 
‘pretension’ or ‘conceit’; one which is tainted at its core not just with any old form of 
ethnocentrism but a supremely distasteful and arrogant form – Eurocentrism; imbued with a 
laughable if not pathetic faith in reason and dressing up its gross subjectivities in the garb of 
objectivity through which it masquerades as the touchstone of ‘the good’ for all people(s). 
 
All these crimes of humanist thought are seen as typical of nineteenth century liberal ideas, 
and certainly quite specific to the European historical/cultural context in which they arose. 
Indeed, Tony Davies says that the idea of an essential humanity is a ‘nineteenth century 
anachronism’, one which remains ‘deeply ingrained in contemporary self-consciousness and 
everyday common sense, so deeply that it requires a conscious effort, every time someone 
appeals to ‘human nature’ or the ‘human condition’, to recall how recent such notions are, 
                                                                                                                                                       
politically strategic form of universal essentialism cannot also be justified. This is suggested in Paul Gilroy’s 
work (see especially Gilroy 2000). But for an interesting critique of Gilroy see Robotham (2005). 
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how specific to a particular history, location and point of view, and how very odd it would 
seem, in cultures historically or ethnologically unlike our own, to separate out and privilege 
‘Man’ in this way.’ (ibid., p. 25). Davies’ claim, the language in which it is couched 
(including the epithet ‘anachronism’), and the assumptions on which it is based, constitute an 
exemplar of ‘cultural turnism’.  
 
The irony is that in making this claim, Davies uses as a foil an anthropological notion of 
‘culture’ (and hence ‘cultures’) based on an idea of particularity and specificity that is itself, 
according to his own logic irrevocably tied to a particular time and place, having also arisen 
in the late nineteenth century in response to certain developments then. But there is no 
conscious effort made to recall this. Nor is there any consideration of a broad history of ideas 
which turns up cognate ideas about ‘humanity’ and ‘human nature’ in other times and other 
places. Let us take, for example, Thucydides’ preface to his famous text which clearly 
expresses the hope that his account of the Peloponnesian War may be judged useful to those 
wishing to understand the past since, human nature being what it is, similar events are bound 
to occur again (Thucydides 1972, I, 48). Stoic thought in both the Greek and Roman worlds 
was steeped in notions of an essential humanity. Well before Thucydides and the Stoics, and 
on the other side of the Eurasian continent, Confucian humanism emphasized the link 
between virtue and humanity attained only by a process of cultivation (see, generally, Tu 
1998; Cua 1991). Interestingly, a contemporary movement in China calls for a version of new 
humanism specifically to counter the ‘New Liberalist’ logic of global capitalism which 
purports to value human freedom, but which is committed only to the freedom of capitalism 
(Li 2008). Another version of humanism has been found in the medieval Islamic world of 
scholarship and learning where openness to new ideas also saw cultivation of the intellect as 
a valued activity (Goodman 2003). This does not mean that all humanist ideas are the same. 
Their expression in different times and places would certainly resonate with local, contextual 
factors giving rise to many variations on the common themes. Even so, these brief examples 
make a nonsense of claims about the (European) specificity and particularity of ideas to do 
with human nature and humanity as universal categories. 
 
Another obvious counter to the claim that humanism is merely a 19th century anachronism 
with a specificity rooted in the particularities of that time is the fact that although the word 
may not have been in common usage before then, the emergence of ideas underpinning the 
concept in European political and social thought spanned several centuries, beginning with 
 
 
 
 
38   Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 
the Renaissance and achieving pride of place in Enlightenment thought (Feher 1991, p. 183). 
Indeed, ‘a new, self-consciously critical attitude toward prevailing cultural practices and 
institutions’ (ibid., emphasis added) is often regarded as the defining characteristic of the 
Enlightenment. Ever since then, however, it seems that humanism has itself been under attack 
from almost every other critical discourse (Surber 1998, p. 24). In the contemporary period, 
Ferenc Feher argues that humanism is the main target of deconstructive philosophical 
criticism on several related grounds. First, it positions ‘Man’ as ‘the philosophical axis of 
world interpretation’. Second, it functions as an oppressive universal, largely because this 
humanist ‘Man’ is actually ‘identical with the European man who embarked on the project of 
remaking the world in the image of the only progressive arrangement he was familiar with as 
well as prepared to recognize: nineteenth-century Europe’, a scenario which forcibly blended 
all differences or persecuted, and sometimes exterminated, those who could not or would not 
be assimilated. It is therefore not merely ethnocentric in a peculiarly European way, it is also 
regarded as racist (ibid., pp. 184-85).  
 
Or so the story goes. But as Feher further notes, key liberal humanist figures such as Kant 
actually opposed colonization, believing that those who purported to be civilizing the 
primitives through such means were acting out a ‘shameful parody of the Enlightenment.’ 
For Kant, emancipation could only be achieved through one’s own deeds or self-tutelage (i.e., 
self-cultivation), and could not be imposed by others (ibid., p. 184), while for Arnold, the true 
barbarians were the English aristocracy. In addition, it is hard to see how a set of ideas 
supporting the unity of humankind can be branded as racist by those seeking the conceptual 
separation of the species on the basis of a thoroughgoing cultural determinism which is every 
bit as insidious as the biological determinism that underpinned European racism of the 
nineteenth century and which it purportedly displaced. 
 
More generally, if humanism – of whatever variety – places an excessive emphasis on 
individualism within a universalistic framework, it is no less a problem than any theory that 
places an excessive emphasis on groupism, of whatever variety. The question is how we can 
construct a viable theory of culture that is not positioned firmly on one side or another of the 
dichotomy and which can support a viable cosmopolitan project that recognizes both the 
particular and the universal. In approaching this question, we look again at the relationship 
between culture, identity and political community and a possible way out of the ontological 
either/or trap.  
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From Cultural Relativism to Cosmopolitan Pluralism 
Although both universalist and relativist approaches have tendencies to absolutism, each 
mode makes an essential contribution to normative theory in that we need to take account of 
both the general and the particular, of sameness and difference. We may well see ‘otherness’ 
as constituted by difference, but this does not mean that we cannot also see the self in the 
other. This suggests the need for a pluralist synthesis attuned to the realities of human 
existence, and co-existence, and the multiplicity of experiences, values, interests and needs 
that subsist not only between groups and collectivities but within them as well, for the 
tendency to homogenize insiders as much as outsiders – a strong tendency in communitarian 
theory – creates other kinds of problems. It also suggests that we need to move away from 
dichotomous thinking towards more of a dialectic mode, enabling an ongoing conversation 
rather than closure around one or other of the oppositions. Let us consider this in relation to 
the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide in normative theory.  
 
In strongly culturalist versions of communitarianism, the community is generally defined by 
‘its culture’ which includes its own particular moral universe. The normative thrust of 
communitarianism therefore tends to relativism (in a cultural sense) and to the adoption of an 
oppositional stance against cosmopolitan claims about universal moral principles.9
 
 For a 
communitarian, the notion of the ‘community of humankind’ is practically an oxymoron 
since communities are by definition a discrete portion of the whole. In contrast, 
cosmopolitanism transcends, but does not negate, the local and affirms the validity of certain 
universalist principles in such matters as basic human rights. This does not necessarily settle 
what is ‘basic’ in the way of rights and what is secondary or supplementary, but it provides a 
minimum framework for universalist claims.  
Neither approach need lead to a form of absolutism, either by denying the relevance of the 
social or cultural world(s) in which humans actually live their lives or by insisting on such a 
radical incommensurability of unique cultural worlds that a notion of common humanity 
becomes impossible. But without some concessions to pluralism from a universalist 
perspective, or to minimum standards of moral behaviour from a more relativist one, both do 
tend strongly towards absolutism. To preserve what is valuable in the concept of culture from 
                                                 
9 At least one communitarian rejects cultural relativism as an obstacle to creating moral dialogues across 
national lines which may in turn provide a source for global moral principles (see Etzioni 1997). 
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cultural absolutism conceived in either particularist or universalist terms, a different approach 
is needed. 
 
In the space between the opposing poles of virtually any dichotomy it is possible to construct 
a middle ground. In terms of the present discussion, that ground is essentially pluralist. 
Because it stands for ‘the many’ rather ‘the one’ – pluralism is sometimes mistakenly equated 
with relativism. But as one leading scholar of global politics notes, an ‘engaged pluralism’ 
recognizes that although concrete phenomena are susceptible to competing explanations, this 
does not equate to an ‘anything goes’ approach nor does it mean that in the absence of true 
foundational standards, no standards are possible at all. (Kratochwil 2003, p. 126).  
 
With respect to culture and normative theory there is, in practice, a middle ground on a range 
of issues that is essential to avoiding the repugnant consequences of absolutist forms of both 
universalism and relativism. Few communitarians would support the custom of human 
sacrifice, even if it was endorsed by the ‘cultural community’ within which it was practiced. 
And it is hard to imagine that any would want to claim that the death camps of Nazi Germany 
could be justified by reference to the unique moral universe of Nazism. On the other hand, 
universalists would be hard put to justify one, and only one, vision of ‘the good’ universally 
applicable across time and space, especially when it comes to deciding who has the authority 
to define ‘the good’ and impose it on others. Due attention to the plurality of values that 
emerge in different settings must therefore play a part in any viable normative theory 
alongside more general principles. Radical approaches to either universalism or relativism, by 
attempting to provide clear and unambiguous positions, lead only to dogmatism and closure 
around a rigid dichotomy.  
 
In contrast with either form of absolutism, pluralism does not provide a site from which 
definitive answers can always be delivered. It is better characterized as an untidy meeting 
place of contesting ideas, lacking firm foundations for certainties (such as those delivered 
from the opposing poles), where boundaries (such as they are) remain fuzzy, and where cut-
off points for tolerance of this or that practice always require a measure of judgment 
according to both context and general principles. A normative position based on this 
approach is best described as cosmopolitan pluralism. It is cosmopolitan in its breadth, 
because it incorporates humanity as a whole, but pluralistic in character because it both 
acknowledges and values the diversity within it. It lies between the conventional 
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understandings of a rigid universalism requiring uniformity on the one hand, and an 
incoherent relativism on the other, and repudiates the dogmatic elements that characterize 
both. Above all, it is dynamic, allowing for the contingent as opposed to the absolute, and 
acknowledging ‘culture’ as endlessly shifting and changing, and certainly never fixed 
permanently in any particular shape or form. It is capable of recognizing the importance of 
specific, local circumstances and socializing influences on individual human development 
while refusing to accept culturally determined outcomes. It does not rely on an evolutionary 
notion of progress suggested by traditional liberal philosophy, but neither does it preclude the 
possibility of making life better for those whose lives are blighted by poverty, violence, and 
injustice. 
 
Reconceptualizing Culture in the ‘Cosmopolitan Turn’ 
Anthropological conceptualizations of culture have helped to generate many insights about 
the value of difference and have served as an important counter to ethnocentricity – 
especially of the ‘Euro’ variety. They have also contributed to insights concerning the 
problems and pitfalls of asserting universalist notions of ‘the good’ in the face of competing 
conceptions derived from different social contexts. In the process, however, the dangers of 
homogenization implicit in universalist conceptions of the good have sometimes simply been 
transferred to the partial entities known as ‘cultures’ which themselves may contain a 
plurality of interests as well as conceptions of the good, often emanating from differential 
placement in hierarchies of power. The notion of culture as always denoting difference has its 
problems as well, for culture understood in this way tends to diminish dynamic properties in 
favour of those which are fixed and timeless – thus constituting localized essences.  
 
Contemporary anthropologists are now among those who endorse a more dynamic approach 
to avoid such problems. The following quotations illustrate a number of difficulties that 
anthropologists have identified in relation to their ‘master concept’ and which are directly 
relevant to the concerns of this article: 
 
Cultural relativism provides an inaccurate set of descriptions of moral pluralism since it 
wields a misguided conception of culture. … [cultural relativists] seem to hold to a 
nineteenth-century notion of culture as discrete and homogeneous ... Their relativism is 
predicated upon bounded conceptions of linguistic and cultural systems, but it falls apart in 
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contexts of hybridity, creolisation, intermixture and the overlapping of political traditions. 
(Wilson 1997, p. 9). 
 
Another provides a similar critique of the discipline’s emphasis on difference:  
 
Culture is used selectively for that which seems most salient to the outsider, namely 
difference. … [it] is used increasingly in public debate to define an arena for contesting 
discourses on “identity”. Under current conditions, such discourses provide an extremely 
fertile field for political entrepreneurship; they allow leaders and spokesmen to claim they are 
speaking on behalf of others; they allow the manipulation of media access; and they 
encourage the strategic construction of polarizing debates that translate into battles of 
influence. Such battles create hegemony and reduce options; they disempower followers and 
reduce the diversity of voices. (Barth 1995, p. 65).  
 
Another powerful argument is that the anthropological replacement of biological difference 
with cultural difference has simply returned racism to its point of departure since it asserts, 
once again, ‘the absolute, impenetrable, untranslatable character of different ways of 
being.’(Finkielkraut 1995, pp. 77, 80). On this view, cultural relativism joined with an 
insider/outsider dichotomy represents not the denial of racist categories of human difference, 
but rather their reaffirmation under a new banner. Stewart Hall also observes that biological 
racism and cultural differentialism constitute not two separate (and opposed) systems but 
rather two registers of racism (quoted in Moore, Pandian & Kosek 2003, p. 27) while 
anthropologist Adam Kuper notes that contemporary cultural anthropologists repudiate the 
popular notion that differences are ‘natural’, but goes on to point out that ‘a rhetoric that 
places great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these views.’ 
Indeed, the insistence that radical differences can be observed between peoples serves to 
sustain them (Kuper 2000, pp. 239-40). 
 
What emerges from these various critiques of the culture concept10
                                                 
10 There are highly relevant critiques from other disciplines as well which there is insufficient space to explore. 
For one insightful contribution from human geography see Mitchell (1995 pp. 102-116). 
 is that its 
conceptualization needs to give more prominence to its dynamic properties, especially in 
terms of the fact that change and transformation takes place through something called 
culture. The culture concept therefore requires restating as a highly complex and contingent 
process rather than an objective, concrete ‘thing’ that defines the foundations for political 
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communities and/or values systems, and certainly not a thing that possesses people. As a 
process which is continuous, ‘culture’ leads neither to a final endpoint, nor is it to be equated 
with ‘progress’. In other words, cultural change can obviously lead to both negative and 
positive outcomes and therefore has no necessary telos. From a humanist and cosmopolitan 
perspective, however, there is always a prospect that things can be changed for the better and 
that critical intellectual engagement is essential to the task.  
 
For any form of study that deals with relationships between groups it is imperative to 
understand that the capacity to interact with other humans, whether they are members of our 
own or other communities, lies in the dynamics of culture itself. Cultural differences between 
individuals and communities notwithstanding, the fact that we are cultural creatures in the 
first place implies the ability to learn to navigate around new and different situations and to 
extend the capacity for inter-subjective communication well beyond one’s own immediate 
social, cultural and political contexts to a cosmopolitan one. Viewed in this way, it is not 
‘culture’ that throws up barriers to understanding and interaction, as assumed in notions of 
‘cultural incommensurability’, but ‘culture’ that actually enables the barriers to be broken 
down. This resonates with the imagining of open social spaces, or ‘world openness’ as 
envisaged by proponents of a new ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ such as Gerard Delanty, who 
also see culture ‘as an on-going process of construction as opposed to being embodied in a 
particular way of life’ (Delanty 2006, p. 31). 
 
Conclusion 
Students of the humanities and social sciences are called on to deal with a highly pluralistic 
world in which both similarities and differences abound within local, national, regional and 
global spheres. It is commonsense to adopt an approach that is sensitive to cultural, historical 
and other contextual factors. This is good practice from both a methodological and normative 
point of view, leading to informed interpretation and explanation.  
 
In an increasingly globalized world, however, it is impossible not to make value judgements 
about problems and issues in locations other than our ‘own’ national or cultural spaces. The 
real problem for the study of politics and international relations, and for any other disciplines 
or fields of study which have to engage with issues that cross any kind of putative cultural 
boundary is not how to avoid making value judgements about those who occupy what may 
 
 
 
 
44   Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.3, No.3, 2011 
seem to be a different set of subjectivities, but how to make value judgements that are well-
informed, reflexive and which take into account of both general principles about the human 
condition as well as the particularities of any given context.   
 
A viable project of critical cosmopolitanism, which incorporates pluralism as a key feature of 
human existence, requires redescribing culture as a highly complex and contingent process 
rather than an objective, concrete ‘thing’ that defines the foundations for particularistic 
communities. In practical terms, this means the promotion of shared cultural norms at a 
global level in the interest of enhancing humanitarian principles and practices, and to which a 
robust conceptualization of humanity is also central. It is worth emphasizing again, however, 
that this by no means suggests that we dispense with the insights of anthropology. Rather, I 
wish to emphasize the extent to which particularist (anthropological) and universalist 
(humanist) approaches both have something to offer in the continuing project of 
conceptualizing ‘culture’ in a world which is likely to remain irredeemably pluralistic while 
also becoming increasingly cosmopolitan11
 
. 
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